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QUIXOTIC ATTEMPT? THE NINTH CIRCUIT, THE BIA,
AND THE SEARCH FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS
FRAMEWORK TO ASYLUM LAW
Shelley M. Hall
Abstract: The Ninth Circuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) historically
have disagreed about the application of human rights norms in many areas of asylum law.
Although recent decisions by the BIA indicate more receptiveness toward the Ninth Circuit's
broader approach, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
seeks to stifle judicial review in many areas of immigration law, including asylum. This
Comment analyzes the potential impact of the law on the development of asylum
jurisprudence and recommends areas for future dialogue between the Ninth Circuit and the

BIA.

"In the absence of judicial review, grave injustices could take
placefor which our government and ourpeople would have to bear
the moral responsibility."1
"[We have now joined the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in its quixotic attempt to right the wrongs of the
world.... 2

Nearly two decades of often vitriolic dialogue between the Ninth
Circuit and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) may have finally
culminated in cooperation. In the past, the two appeals bodies had
exchanged interpretations, and sometimes insults, about the proper
approach to asylum law since Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980.?
The BIA's narrow interpretation reflected immigration concerns and U.S.
foreign policy priorities, while the Ninth Circuit grounded its opinions in
the humanitarian purposes of the Refugee Act. In 1996, however, the
BIA issued two precedential opinions that adopted many of the Ninth
Circuit's propositions the BIA had long resisted.4 This rapprochement

1. Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 433 (9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ.,
specially concurring).
2. In re H-, Int.Dec. 3276, at 20 (B.I.A. 1996) (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting).

3. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(Supp. II 1996)). The Refugee Act forms the statutory basis for modem asylum law.

4. H-, Int.Dec. 3276; In re S-P-, Int. Dec. 3287 (B.I.A. 1996). The BIA must apply Ninth Circuit
precedent within the circuit but can reject it elsewhere unless the Board adopts the reasoning as its
own. See Matter of Anselmo, 20 1. & N. Dec. 25, 31-32 (B.I.A. 1989).
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signals a renewed commitment to the human rights underpinnings of

asylum law and an opportunity for further development-quixotic or not.
The BIA's transformation also exemplifies the positive influence of
judicial review in the field of immigration law. Ironically, the

breakthrough developed just as Congress tried to limit judicial influence
in this field. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) eliminates or narrows the scope of
judicial review in many areas, including asylum.' Although the full
import of these provisions remains unclear, they could stunt the type of
agency-court dialogue that influenced the recent changes within the BIA.
Rather than cabining its review functions in the wake of IIRIRA, the
Ninth Circuit should continue efforts to advance asylum law. The usual
administrative agency deference6 is ineffective and even inappropriate in
the asylum setting because the BIA lacks specialized expertise to
interpret the Refugee Act.7 Unlike most immigration laws, which reflect
evolving policy goals, the Refugee Act requires neutral analysis honoring

its humanitarian purpose.8 Undue deference to the BIA, a political body,
risks elevating policy goals above humanitarian concerns, which is
exactly what Congress wished to avoid when it passed the Act.9 Judicial
review prevents potential misinterpretation and stagnation.'"

5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 (amending Immigration and Nationality Act § 242,
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. II 1996) [hereinafter INA]).
6. The seminal case on deference to administrative agencies is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court required deference
when Congress left statutes silent or ambiguous and the agency interpretation was not arbitrary or
capricious. Id. at 843-44. The facts
of Chevron, however, involved agency rulemaking rather than
adjudication. Id. at 840-44. See Maureen B. Callahan, JudicialReview ofAgency Legal Determinations in Asylum Cases, 28 Willamette L. Rev. 773, 788 (1992) (urging deference to agency
adjudicatory decisions only where warranted under circumstances); Michael G. Heyman, Judicial
Review of DiscretionaryImmigration Decisionmaking, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 861, 907 (1994)
(arguing that adjudicatory decisions require less deference than policymaking decisions).
7. Asylum cases constitute only 30% of the BIA caseload. Vicente A. Tome, Administrative
Notice of Changed Country Conditions in Asylum Adjudication, 27 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 411,
425 n.93 (1994). Tome adds that BIA members lack training on foreign country conditions, key
factors in asylum claims. Id. at 440.
8. See Callahan, supra note 6, at 788-89; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
444-50 (1987) (reaffirming judiciary's role in interpreting Refugee Act).

§ 306(a)(2),

9. See Callahan, supra note 6, at 785; Cynthia R.S. Schiesswohl, Judicial Autonomy in the
ImmigrationAdjudicatorySystem, 21 U. Dayton L. Rev. 743, 756 (1996).

10. See Deborah E. Anker, The Law of Asylum in the United States: A Guide to Administrative
Practice and Case Law 23-24 (2d ed. Supp. 1992) (noting deleterious effects of administrative
isolation on development of asylum law); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and
"Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237, 258 (1983) (arguing that

Ninth Circuit Review of Political Asylum Cases
The dialogue between the Ninth Circuit and the BIA stands as a
successful model of judicial review, albeit a work in progress. Important
issues still remain unresolved and require the combined attention of the
two appeals bodies. The BIA's shift marks an opportunity to address
those issues further and remove political overtones from statutory
interpretation.
This Comment examines the evolving relationship between the Ninth
Circuit and the BIA. Part I briefly explains the requirements of asylum
and the international roots of the Refugee Act. In Part II, this Comment
provides examples of past divergence between the BIA and the Ninth
Circuit in interpreting the Refugee Act. It explores how effectively the
two appeals bodies have complied with international standards. Part III
explains how this dialogue has advanced asylum law by influencing the
BIA to give effect to the Refugee Act's human rights purposes. That
adjustment remains tenuous, however, and Part IV analyzes whether
IIRIRA could prevent future constructive dialogue. This Comment
concludes in Part V with recommendations on issues the Ninth Circuit
and the BIA should address in future discourse.
I.

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF U.S. ASYLUM LAW

Asylum applicants face two obstacles before receiving protective
relief under U.S. law. First, they must meet the statutory definition of
"refugee." 1 The definition requires (1) a well-founded fear of (2) persecution (3) on account of (4) race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. 12 Most debates between
review bodies turn on the interpretation of these key phrases.

administrative isolation damages agencies by preventing them from maturing as they would in
dialogue with courts).
11. INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (Supp. II 1996).
12. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. II 1996). The full text defines refugee
as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
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Second, an applicant who meets the definition also must receive a
discretionary grant of asylum from the decisionmaker.13 The decisionmaker may refuse to grant asylum based on negative factors. 4 Early BIA
policy allowed almost unfettered negative discretion when adverse
factors such as document fraud occurred. 5 The BIA later retreated from
that formalistic approach and crafted guidelines that presume positive
discretion in most cases. 16 Single negative factors1 7 are no longer
dispositive, and decisionmakers must weigh all equities.
Restriction on removal, formerly named withholding of deportation, is
a companion provision to asylum that eliminates the government's
discretionary power and mandates protection if applicants prove their
lives "would be threatened because of" the grounds enumerated in the
statute. 8 The United States cannot refoul, or return, such victims to
persecuting countries. 9 Restriction on removal requires applicants to
meet a higher burden of proof than the discretionary relief of asylum, 0
but the other terms in the statutes are interpreted identically.2' Applicants
denied either form of relief can appeal to the BIA, which is the
administrative appeals body.' The statute also provides for review in
federal court after an applicant exhausts administrative remedies.'

13. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 441. INS asylum officers make some initial asylum
decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (1997). Immigration judges, who are part of the Executive Office of
Immigration Review, also make asylum decisions during removal hearings. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b)
(1997).
14. See Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 441; Matter of Pula, 19 1. & N. Dec. 467, 473-74 (B.I.A.
1987).
15. See, e.g., Matter ofSalim, 18 . & N. Dec. 311,315-16 (B.I.A. 1982).
16. Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec., at 473-74.
17. Id. at 473. Examples of discretionary factors are fraudulent entry, length of time spent in safe
third countries, family ties, age, health, and seriousness of risk. Id. at 473-74.
18. The enumerated grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1996). The
provision was renamed "restriction on removal" by IIRIRA. See INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A).
19. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). This protection derives from the international
norm of non-refoulement, or non-rejection. Although the government cannot deport these victims to
the persecuting country, it can deport them to other safe countries. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 123 1(b)(3)(A).
20. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,430-31 (1987). Restriction/withholding cases use
"would be" language that requires persecution to be more likely than not, while asylum requires only
a one in ten chance. Id.
21. See, e.g., Desirv. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988).
22. INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iv) (Supp. Il 1996) (administrative appeal).
23. INA § 242,8 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. I 1996) (judicial review).

Ninth Circuit Review of Political Asylum Cases
Both asylum and restriction on removal are humanitarian rather than
political in nature. Congress passed the Refugee Act to comply with our
international obligations under the 1967 Refugee Protocol, 24 a
humanitarian measure that incorporates the provisions of the 1951
Refugee Convention.' The Refugee Convention mandates nonrefoulement in some cases and urges asylum in others.26 Congress
modeled the Refugee Act on the Refugee Convention by mirroring its
language almost verbatim.27
The Refugee Act significantly revised U.S. asylum law, which
previously had admitted refugees based on ideological factors rather than
neutral, humanitarian standards.28 Legislative history reveals that

Congress expected the Refugee Act to codify "our national commitment
to human rights and humanitarian concerns."2 9 Congress also wanted a
broad law that would provide flexibility during crises.30 Because the
Refugee Act derives from treaties and human rights norms, the U.S.
Supreme Court has indicated that decisionmakers should rely on
interpretations of the Refugee Protocol for guidance in interpreting the
Refugee Act.3"

24. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
267; see also Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 436-37.
25. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The United States did not become a party to the
Refugee Convention, but is bound by provisions incorporated into the Refugee Protocol.
26. Id. at 176 (prohibiting expulsion when lives would be threatened), 152-54 (defining refugee).
27. One difference is that the Refugee Act uses the phrase "on account of" rather than the word
"for." Refugee Convention, supra note 25, at 152. For the text of the Refugee Act definition, see
supra note 12.
28. Earlier laws granted protection only to those fleeing either Communist countries or the Middle
East. See Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? DivorcingRefugee Protectionsfrom Human
Rights Norms, 15 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1179, 1184 (1994). The policy of using political factors
unfortunately still appeals to some. See Overheard,Newsweek, Dec. 23, 1991, at 17, 17 (quoting
then-Presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan as saying, "[i]fwe had to take a million immigrants in,
say, Zulus next year, or Englishmen, and put them in Virginia, what group would be easier to
assimilate and would cause less problems... T').
29. S. Rep. No. 96-256, at 24 (1979), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 141.
30. See Musalo, supranote 28, at 1194-95 (citing 126 Cong. Rec. 4499 (1980)).
31. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429-31 (1987). "[T]he [U.N.] Handbook provides
significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform. It has been
widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes." Id. at 439
n.22.
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COMPARISON OF NINTH CIRCUIT AND BIA APPROACHES
TO ASYLUM LAW

The international law background framed the context in which courts
crafted approaches to asylum cases. The Ninth Circuit took a broad
approach to interpreting the Refugee Act, while the BIA interpreted the
Act more narrowly. The Ninth Circuit ruled on more asylum cases than
any other circuit3 2 and deferred less to BIA decisions than most circuits.3 3
Because of these two factors, it developed its own thorough body of
asylum case law34 that differed significantly from the BIA standards
applied elsewhere.
The Ninth Circuit generally grounded its decisions in the humanitarian
purpose of the Refugee Act and cited regularly to interpretations by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.35 The court also
eschewed political and immigration policy concerns, such as border
control, when making asylum decisions.36 This resulted in a broad
interpretation of the refugee definition that encompassed the human
rights goals Congress hoped to achieve.
The BIA's narrower interpretation often relied on political,
"floodgate" concerns when denying asylum claims.37 Moreover, the
BIA's decisions were notorious for their reflection of U.S. foreign policy

32. See Musalo, supra note 28, at 1188 n.37 (noting that bulk of cases in 1980s involved Central
American asylum applicants detained in California).
33. See Mendoza Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, J., concurring
specially). See generally supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing deference in asylum
setting).
34. For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit's early role in developing asylum law, see generally
Carolyn P. Blum, The Ninth Circuit and the ProtectionofAsylum Seekers Since the Passageof the
Refugee Act of 1980,23 San Diego L. Rev. 327 (1986).
35. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbookon Proceduresand
CriteriaforDeterminingRefugee Status Under the 1951 Convention andthe 1967 ProtocolRelating
to the Status ofRefugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng. Rev. 2 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. Handbook]; see
also, e.g., Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (tracing Ninth Circuit's
history of following U.N. Handbook principles).
36. Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 433 (Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ., specially concurring) (noting
that partisan politics sometimes taints agency decisions and requires correction through judicial
review); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Mhe significance of a
specific threat to an individual's life or freedom is not lessened by the fact that the individual resides
in a country where the lives and freedom of a large number of persons are threatened.").
37. See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 894 F.2d 1292, 1299 n.5
(11th Cir. 1990) (upholding BIA denial of asylum based partly on fears that broad interpretation of
Refugee Act would extend protection to everyone in warring countries).

Ninth Circuit Review of Political Asylum Cases
priorities.38 This policy approach often searched for ways to deny rather
than to grant protection39 and contrasted markedly with the Ninth
Circuit's broader approach. The disparity between the two bodies
developed into an ongoing dialogue over several key issues.
A.

Mixed Motives and the "On Account Of" RequirementforAsylum

Mixed motive cases highlight the contrasting results achieved by the
Ninth Circuit's and the BIA's approaches to asylum law. Every asylum
applicant must show he or she fears persecution "on account of" one of
the grounds enumerated in the statute,40 which requires a link between
the persecution and the stated grounds.4 This makes sense in the
abstract, but in reality it only provides guidance in rare cases where the
persecutor has acted solely on an impermissible agenda. Persecutors, just
like other human beings, act from a variety of mixed motives. The issue
then reduces to whether "on account of" means solely "on account of,"
or whether a lesser link involving mixed motives will suffice.
One striking example of a case turning on the interpretation of "on
account of" was Matter ofJuan, an unpublished BIA opinion.42 Juan was
a fifteen-year-old Guatemalan whose parents were kidnapped and
decapitated by government soldiers for allegedly selling corn to
guerrillas.43 The BIA grudgingly applied Ninth Circuit rules and
approved Juan's asylum application, because political opinion was one
reason for his persecution.' The dissent instead claimed the Guatemalan
government was only "making examples and intimidating the
population" rather than targeting Juan's family on political grounds.45
38. One study in 1987 found a correlation between asylum approval rates and countries with
governments supported by the United States. For example, compare Nicaragua, 83.9%, Romania,
59.7%, and Afghanistan, 26.2%, with Guatemala, 3.8%, and El Salvador, 3.6%. National Lawyers
Guild, ImmigrationLaw and Defense § 13.1(c), at 13-10 n.9 (3d ed. 1997). Another study showed
that of applicants fearing torture, only Salvadorans actually were deported. Id. at 13-10 to 13-10.1
n.9.
39. See Perlera-Escobar,894 F.2d at 1298 (arguing that broad interpretation would "create a
sinkhole that would swallow the rule").
40. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. H 1996); see also supra note 18.
41. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,482-84 (1992).
42. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration Process and Policy 834 (3d ed. 1995)
(citing Refugee Reports,Nov. 17, 1989, at 13).
43. Id.

44. Id
45. Id.(citing Refugee Reports, Nov. 17, 1989, at 14 (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting)). The

Juan case also addresses imputed political opinion (IPO), an issue that often accompanies mixed
motives. IPO recognizes that persecutors make mistakes and persecute victims who they assume
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This mixed motive, the dissent argued, disqualified Juan from asylum
eligibility.46
An expansive reading of the phrase "on account of" adheres to the
humanitarian notions underlying the law by recognizing the difficulties
of proof in asylum cases.47 The U.N. Handbook recommends granting
applicants the "benefit of the doubt 4 because establishing clear causal
links is impossible in many political opinion cases.49 A broad approach
also recognizes that persecutors often see persecution as a means to an
end rather than the end itself. The U.S. government should not deny
protection to victims who had the misfortune of suffering under an
unfocused persecutor. Instead, the humanitarian purpose of the Refugee
Act compels granting relief if persecution has at least partial links to the
enumerated grounds.
Despite the humanitarian purpose of asylum law and guidance from
the United Nations, the BIA chose a much narrower interpretation of "on
account of" that eliminated relief in many cases. The BIA's analysis
began with the assumption that punishment had a permissible purpose. 0
Rather than conforming to the humanitarian purposes of the Refugee
Act, this logic narrowed the meaning of "on account of" to apply only
when the persecutor had no other "rational and strategic purpose" to
persecute."' This undermined the U.N. Handbook's policy and pre-

ordained negative outcomes.5" One circuit court recognized that this
analysis would have the ridiculous effect of denying asylum to

hold certain political opinions. When someone is persecuted because of an IPO, she should qualify
for asylum; her true beliefs are irrelevant. Denying asylum would simply punish victims who have
the misfortune of suffering under careless persecutors. See, e.g., Harpinder Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d
1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Hemandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1985).
46. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 42, at 834 (citing Refugee Reports, Nov. 17, 1989, at 14
(Heilman, Board Member, dissenting)).
47. "Persecutors are hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of
persecution." Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1985).
48. U.N. Handbook, supranote 35, 196.
49. Id. 81.
50. See, e.g., Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, 19 1. & N. Dec. 509, 517 (B.LA. 1988).
51. Montecino v. INS, 915 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1990).
52. The BIA tried to buttress its approach with INS v. Elias-Zacarias,502 U.S. 478 (1992), which
raised questions about mixed motives reasoning. See Anker, supra note 10, at 17-19; see also Matter
of R-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 621 (B.I.A. 1992) (stating that Ninth Circuit's rationale was overruled by U.S.
Supreme Court). However, that reliance was misplaced because Elias-Zacariasdid not reject mixed
motives analysis. See Anker, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that opinion is narrowly grounded in facts
of case and provides little guidance to legal issues in asylum law). Therefore, the Board's theories
remained unjustified by either international or U.S. Supreme Court interpretations.

Ninth Circuit Review of Political Asylum Cases
Alexander Solzhenitsyn because his dispute with the Soviet Union was
literary rather than political. 3
A majority of the circuits deferred to the BIA's narrow decisions on
mixed motive cases,54 but the Ninth Circuit conducted its own analysis
and aligned itself with the U.N. Handbook.5 It recognized that the
"motive underlying any political choice may, if examined closely, prove
to be, in whole or in part, non-political."56 With such distinctly different
justifications for their analyses, the Ninth Circuit and the BIA remained
at an impasse.
B.

PersecutionDuring a Time of Civil Strife

Mixed motives cases often occur during times of civil strife because
warring parties always have the overriding, impersonal motive of gaining
power. Yet the courts and the BIA have struggled over whether civil
strife itself precludes relief. Authorities agree that asylum does not
protect those fleeing the general dangers of war alone.57 Refugee status
requires an individualized fear of persecution on account of the
enumerated grounds;5" widespread violence alone fails to prove
individualized risk.59 In such situations, as with natural disasters,6'
temporary measures often provide more appropriate responses.'
A per se approach to interpreting civil strife cases could produce the

anomalous result of rejecting all asylum claims from war-tom countries.
For example, a woman fearing the continued bombing of Sarajevo would
not fit the refugee definition. A woman fearing rape and forced
53. Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1994).
54. See Sachin D. Adarkar, Comment, PoliticalAsylum and PoliticalFreedom: Moving Towards
a Just Definition of "Persecution on Account of Political Opinion" Under the Refugee Act,
42 UCLA L. Rev. 181, 189 (1994).
55. See, e.g., Surinder Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d 375, 379 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); Harpinder Singh v.
Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1988).
56. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1985). The court also rejected the
claim that Elias-Zacariasprecluded mixed motives analysis. HarpinderSingh, 63 F.3d at 1509.
57. See U.N. Handbook, supra note 35, 164; see also Prasad v. INS, 83 F.3d 315, 318 (9th Cir.
1996); Matter of Acosta, 19 L & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
58. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. H 1996); see also supranote 12.
59. Prasad,83 F.3dat318.
60. U.N. Handbook, supra note 35, 39.
61. See generally Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a
CustomaryNorm, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 551 (1986) (describing growth in international efforts to provide
temporary protection). But see Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight from Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary
"Refuge" and Local Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 13 (1994) (arguing that
nations now abuse temporary protection by using it instead of granting asylum to genuine refugees).
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pregnancy by Bosnian Serbs in her village who have threatened her
personally also would not qualify under such a cramped reading. The
provisions of the Refugee Protocol 62 and the Refugee Act 63 encourage a
different result.' The U.N. Handbookurges a case by case assessment of

all claims65 because "foreign invasion or occupation of all or part of a

country can result-and occasionally has resulted-in persecution."'
Blanket rejections also make little sense under other sources of
international law. Even war is governed by humanitarian standards. The
Geneva Conventions of 194967 and Protocol II of 197768 require warring
parties to attack only legitimate military targets. Civilians must receive
protection from these attacks and from cruel treatment such as torture or

rape.69 The Geneva Conventions may not provide an independent right to
protection in U.S. courts,70 but a person fearing violations of humanitarian law arguably meets the refugee definition.7'

Although the BIA had said persecution can exist in civil war,7" it
rarely accepted claims of well-founded fear in such settings. Rather, the
BIA narrowly reasoned that harm targeted at individuals failed to qualify
as persecutory if "directly related" to war.7 3 This reading, like the

62. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
63. Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(Supp. II 1996)).
64. Guy S.Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in InternationalLaw 75 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that war
and asylum are not incompatible).
65. U.N. Handbook, supranote 35, 166.
66. Id. 165.
67. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
68. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (1977).
69. Id. at612.
70. Matter of Medina, 19 . & N. Dec. 734 (B.I.A. 1988).
71. See Matter of S-P-, Int. Dec. 3287 (B.LA. 1996); Northwest Immigrant Rights Project,
Winning Asylum Cases: A Manual for Pro Bono Attorneys 3-12 (1995) [hereinafter Pro Bono
Manual].
72. Matter of Villalta, 20 1. & N. Dec. 142 (B.A. 1990).
73. Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811, 815 (B.I.A. 1988). But see U.N. Handbook,
supranote 35, I 164-66.
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requirement of a single invidious motive, narrowed the refugee definition
so tightly that few obtained relief. The BIA justified torture of innocents
when the government was "driven to revenge" by terrorists,' which
essentially suspended the protections of the Geneva Conventions. The
BIA used similar reasoning with victims of guerrilla kidnapping.75 This
odd argument assumed that guerrillas could legitimately conscript
soldiers, something usually reserved for sovereigns.76

Conversely, the Ninth Circuit often pointed to violent conditions to
support the weight and credibility of an applicant's persecution claims."
The Ninth Circuit consistently overturned cases when the BIA justified
violence in contravention of humanitarian law. The court rejected the
BIA rationale that would justify even the most extreme responses to
rebellion,79 and it refused to recognize the legitimacy of guerrilla
conscription."° Yet the BIA's narrow reading continued to adversely
affect asylum applicants outside the Ninth Circuit.
C.

Allocating the Burden of Proofin PastPersecutionCases

Past persecution represented a third area of continual disagreement
between the Ninth Circuit and the BIA. Evidence of past persecution
alone fulfills the statutory requirements for asylum, even without a wellfounded fear of future persecution." However, asylum may be denied at
the decisionmaker's discretion if the persecuting country has become
safe.8" This usually happens when conditions have changed83 or when
74. See Matter of R-, 20 L& N. Dec. 621, 636 (B.I.A. 1992) (Heilman, Board Member,
concurring) ("We know from our own history that policemen who consider themselves targets of
extremists understandably react in ways that have little to do with constitutional theory, or
conventional police procedures."); Matter of T-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 571 (B.LA. 1992).
75. See Matter of R-O-, 20 . & N. Dec. 455 (B.I.A. 1992).
76. See Mark R. von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of "Persecution" in American Refugee Law:
PoliticalOpinion and the Dilemma ofNeutrality, 13 Suffolk Transnat'l L.J. 1,29 (1989).
77. Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1985).
78. See, e.g., Prasad v. INS, 83 F.3d 315 (9th Cir. 1996); Montecino v. INS, 915 F.2d 518 (9th
Cir. 1990); Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
79. See Harpinder Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding persecution when
government exceeded bounds of legitimate investigation); Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 868
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding persecution when government swept in innocents with guerrillas).
80. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
81. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (Supp. II 1996); Desir v. llchert, 840
F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988); Matter of Chen, 20 L & N. Dec. 16, 18 (B.LA. 1988).
82. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) (1997); Chen, 20 .& N. Dec. at 18.
83. See, e.g., Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 20.
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danger exists in only one region.8' The United States also may grant
asylum at its discretion if the applicant has suffered such traumatic past
harm that there are "compelling reasons" not to return him or her, even
though the danger has passed." Historically, controversy has arisen over
who bears the burden of proving the persecuting country's current
conditions: the applicant or the government.86
The U.N. Handbook presumes an applicant will face future persecution if she has proven past persecution. 7 If the government wishes to
rebut this presumption, it bears the burden of proof.88 The approach is
logical, because there is no reason to presume the persecutor has
reformed. It is pragmatic because most asylum applicants do not come
armed with sheaves of data about the persecuting countries.8 9 The U.S.
government, on the other hand, does possess the resources necessary to
gauge current country conditions.
The BIA often marred its past persecution opinions with
misinterpretation. Although a case in the late 1980s, Matter of Chen,"
agreed with the U.N. Handbook'srebuttable presumption interpretation, 9'
the BIA often failed to apply the standard properly.9' The Chen opinion
agreed that if the government carried its burden of rebuttal proof, the
applicant still could obtain protection by showing compelling reasons to
receive asylum.93 However, immigration judges and the BIA twisted this
84. See, e.g., Surinder Singh v. lchert, 69 F.3d 375, 379 (9th Cir. 1995); Matter of R-, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 621, 625 (B.I.A. 1992). Country-wide danger in future persecution claims is discussed further
infra Part V.
85. 8 C.F.tR § 208.13(b)(1)(ii); see also U.N. Handbook, supra note 35, 136; Chen, 20 I. & N.
Dec. at 21.
86. See, e.g., Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1996); Harpinder Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d
1501, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995).
87. "It may be assumed that a person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he has already
been the victim of persecution for one of the reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention." U.N.
Handbook,supra note 35, 45.
88. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 64, at 86-87. Goodwin-Gill distinguishes between cases where
applicants try to prove future persecution despite changed conditions and cases where applicants
have already proven persecution, but the government wants to deny protection because of changed
conditions. He argues that applicants carry the burden of proof in the first instance, while the
government carries the burden in the second. Id.
89. See U.N. Handbook, supra note 35,
196-97 (noting proof problems and urging
governments to elicit information).
90. 20 I.&N. Dec. 16.
91. Id. at 18.
92. See, e.g., Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1996); Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d
1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1986).
93. Chen, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 19.
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analysis, often requiring an applicant to prove compelling need first
without requiring the government to rebut the presumption of continued,
country-wide persecution.94
New asylum regulations adopted in 1990 included the presumption of
future persecution. 95 The rules provided that in past persecution cases the
applicant "shall be presumed also to have a well-founded fear of
persecution unless a preponderance of the evidence" proves otherwise.
However, the BIA read this command narrowly. It declined to apply the
presumption in country-wide persecution cases97 and took administrative
"notice" of changed conditions in other cases,9 8 thereby establishing the
government's rebuttal proof and reverting the burden to the applicant. 99
Despite the regulation's command, applicants still risked denial unless
they acted preemptively by proving both past and future persecution.
Once again, the Ninth Circuit chose a different route. Like the BIA, it
recognized that past persecution provided a self-sufficient ground for
asylum, so the applicant's burden of proof ended at that point. 00 Unlike
the BIA, the Ninth Circuit consistently applied that interpretation under
both Chen' and the regulations.' The court also restricted the BIA's
use of administrative notice unless the applicant had an opportunity to
rebut the noticed facts.0 3
These strategies, unlike those employed by the BIA, imbued past
persecution analysis with the remedial and protective spirit of the
Refugee Act. The court and the BIA appeared unlikely to meet common
ground until the Board recognized its policy violated international

94. See, e.g., Osorio, 99 F.3d at 932; Damaize-Job,787 F.2d at 1335.
95. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1997).
96. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i).
97. See, e.g., Matter of K-S-, 20 L & N. Dec. 715 (B.I.A. 1993); Matter of R-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 621
(B.I.A. 1992).
98. See, e.g., Matter of H-M-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 683 (B.LA. 1993); Matter of R-R-, 20 1. & N. Dec.
547 (B.I.A. 1992).
99. See, e.g., H-M-, 20 .& N. Dec. at 688-89; R-, 201. & N. Dec. at 627; R-R-, 20 1. & N. Dec. at
551.
100. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[N]o further showing that he or she
'would be' persecuted is required."). The court used "would be" language because it was referring to
withholding of deportation (restriction on removal) rather than asylum.
101. See, e.g., Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928,932 (9th Cir. 1996).
102. See, e.g., Prasad v. INS, 83 F.3d 315, 318 (9th Cir. 1996); Surinder Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d
375 (9th Cir. 1995); Harpinder Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995).
103. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1996); Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d
1017 (9th Cir. 1992).
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intent, and the Justice Department's own

III. RECENT BIA DECISIONS AND A NEW DIRECTION FOR
ASYLUM LAW
Dialogue with the Ninth Circuit gradually altered the BIA's analysis
and culminated in a profound shift. The Board issued two precedential
decisions in 1996" that reversed much of its existing law and instead
espoused the broader approach of the Ninth Circuit. The decisions
themselves did not break any new legal ground. However, by
recognizing theories already accepted in the Ninth Circuit and in
international law, the cases did signal a significant change in analytic
approach that will benefit future asylum applicants. 5
A.

The Facts of In re H- and In re S-P-

The two landmark decisions were factually similar to hundreds of
claims previously denied by the BIA. H- was a Somali member of the
Darood clan and Marehan subclan who had suffered past persecution
based on clan membership. 6 The Marehans had ties to the regime of
Mohammed Siad Barre, which was toppled in 1991. The country was left
with no true government, and in the ensuing power struggle members of
other clans targeted the Marehans for their privileged positions. 7 An
opposing clan murdered H-'s father and brother, attacked his town,
detained him without charges, and brutally beat him.' 8 H- fled Somalia
for the United States."° The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied asylum
because he believed that the Refugee Act did not provide relief from
"clan warfare" or "civil warfare."'" 0
Similarly, S-P- was an ethnic Tamil who fled persecution by the Sri
Lankan army."' The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("Tigers"), a
rebel group, had kidnapped him from a refugee camp and pressed him
104. In re S-P-, Int.Dec. 3287 (B.I.A. 1996); In re H-, Int.Dec. 3276 (B.I.A. 1996).
105. See Deborah Anker et al., The BU's New Asylum Jurisprudenceand Its Relevance for
Women's Claims, 73 Interpreter Releases 1173 (1996).
106. H-, Int.Dec. 3276, at 6.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 6-7.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at2.
111. In re S-P-, Int.
Dec. 3287, at 2-3 (B.I.A. 1996).
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into forced labor."' The Sri Lankan army raided the Tigers' camp and
captured S-P-."3 He was beaten, interrogated, tortured, and threatened
with death while the soldiers tried to extract information about the
Tigers. The soldiers also accused him of being a Tiger."4 S-P- was
released after relatives bribed the army, and he then fled the country." 5
The IJ denied asylum for two reasons. First, she held that the soldiers did
not inflict harm with the motive of persecuting him "on account of" one
of the five grounds." 6 Second, she concluded that the abuse was part of
ongoing civil war not covered by asylum law." 7
Both H- and S-P- appealed to the BIA. The claims appeared destined
for failure. The fact patterns involved mixed motives, civil strife, past
persecution, and several other controversial issues such as imputed
political opinion, non-governmental persecutors, and previously
unrecognized social groups. Equally important, both claims arose in
countries on relatively cordial terms with the United States. These cases
were more likely to go the way of applications from El Salvador and
Guatemala than claims from Afghanistan or Nicaragua." 8
1.

The BIA"s Holdingin In re H-

The BIA defied expectations and its own history in civil strife cases
by reversing both IJs. In H-, it directly stated that civil war and
individual persecution can co-exist." 9 The BIA cited approvingly an
earlier decision that allowed claims from war zones 2 ' and rejected fears
that the floodgates would open to all citizens of warring countries.' The
BIA emphasized that an applicant must show individualized harm, but
that civil war would not undermine that showing."

112. Id
113. Id. at3.
114. Iad

115. Id at4.
116. Id. at 4-5; see also supranote 12 and accompanying text.
117. Id. at 5.
118. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Matter of R-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 621 (B.I.A.
1992).
119. In re H-, Int. Dec. 3276, at 11 (B.LA. 1996).
120. Matter of Villalta, 20 1. & N. Dec. 142 (B.I.A. 1990).
121. H-, Int. Dec. 3276, at 11.
122. Id at 14.
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The majority also clarified ambiguities in its past persecution
standard. The BIA reaffirmed the Chen" holding that past persecution
alone satisfies the applicant's statutory burden.' 24 The BIA then provided
detailed instructions on applying the regulations on past persecution. It
noted that IJs cannot require applicants to prove anything more unless
the government first rebuts the presumption of continued persecution. 'I
The decision prompted a short but angry dissent from board member
Heilman. He suggested that the majority's civil strife holding would
entitle anyone from a war zone to asylum.' 26 He also criticized the BIA
for following the Ninth Circuit's lead, calling the court's jurisprudence a
"quixotic attempt" to change the world.'2 7 Heilman's dissent, however,
ignored that asylum remains an individualized, discretionary decision.
The government is not powerless in the face of an unlikely mass influx.
It retains the right to deny asylum based on discretion or to eliminate
asylum altogether. 28 The Ninth Circuit and the new BIA are simply
recognizing that the Refugee Act's language and purpose require
individualized assessments rather than blanket rejections.
2.

The BIA 's Holdings in In re S-P-

S-P- reiterated the holding of H- and expanded it to encompass civil
war. The opinion cited to Ninth Circuit precedent approvingly, labeling
extra-judicial government punishment during war as persecutory.' 29 The
BIA used this precedent to reject implicitly its earlier acceptance of
uncontrolled government response to rebel threats. 3 It also recognized
that violations of the Geneva Conventions can support asylum claims,"
an important step toward maintaining a focus on human rights rather than
immigration policy.

123. Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (B.I.A. 1989).
124. H-, Int. Dec. 3276, at 3-6.
125. Id. at 14-16.
126. Id. at 20 (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting).
127. I (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting).
128. The Refugee Protocol does not mandate asylum. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying
text.
129. In re S-P-, Int. Dec. 3287, at 8-9 (B.LA. 1996) (citing Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501 (9th
Cir. 1995)).

130. Id at 9.
131. Id at 12n.3.
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S-P- also tackled the controversy of mixed motives. It returned to BIA
precedent recognizing that persecutors may act for several reasons. 32
The BIA acknowledged that proving exact motives is often impossible,
leaving many valid asylum applicants without recourse.' The Board
held that the applicant must only produce evidence from which "it is
reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated by a protected
ground."' 34 This reasonable person standard reverses the BIA's former
presumption that authorities ordinarily act for legitimate reasons.'35
The BIA paid homage to both the Ninth Circuit and the international
roots of asylum law in crafting its holding. It analyzed the Ninth
Circuit's mixed motives reasoning in detail, including cases reversing
BIA decisions.' 36 It also referred to the "fundamental humanitarian
concerns of asylum law" and the legislative history of the Refugee Act.'37
Finally, the BIA urged a generous approach in times of doubt, 3 ' which
reflects the U.N. Handbook's suggestion.'"
S-P- reached farther than H- and created greater division within the
Board. Several members concurred because the case arose in the Ninth
Circuit, and the BIA must apply circuit standards. 4 ' However, they
opposed adopting those standards for nationwide use. 4' The holdings of
S-P- lack the full support that H- engendered.
B.

Significance of the Opinions

The opinions of H- and S-P- signal great changes at the BIA. The BIA
could have rested on Ninth Circuit precedent and thereby confined its
holdings, but instead chose to adopt new nationwide standards. 42 The
opinions also laid the groundwork for more change by alluding to
international law and by emphasizing the humanitarian purposes of
132. Id. at 6 (citing Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (B.I.A. 1988)). The court noted that
the mixed motives comments were only dicta in Fuentes.Id.
133. Id.
134. lt
135. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
136. S-P-, Int.Dec. 3287, at 7-9.
137. Id,at 10.
138. Id
139. U.N. Handbook; supranote 35, 204.
140. S-P-, Int. Dec. 3287, at 18 (Filppu, Board Member, concurring).
141. Ia One member also dissented because he doubted the applicant's credibility. Id.at 19
(Vacca, Board Member, dissenting).
142. Id at 18 (Filppu, Board Member, concurring).
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asylum. This groundwork will allow the BIA to read the Refugee Act
more expansively on other issues as well.
The two cases illustrate the positive results achieved through dialogue
between the courts and the BIA. The opinions credited Ninth Circuit
influence with shaping the new BIA approach. 43 This active judicial role
undermines the typical criticism of review in the administrative setting:
that a court will simply substitute its judgment for that of the agency"'
To the contrary, judicial review was necessary because the BIA had
strayed into an area where it lacked expertise. H- and S-P- rectified that
problem by creating an analytic framework complying with the Refugee
Act's purpose. More uniform decisions encompassing the Act's purpose
should result.
Despite the advancements in H- and S-P-, the Ninth Circuit must
maintain its active role. Both opinions created dissension on the Board,
and the concurring and dissenting opinions clearly opposed adopting
Ninth Circuit standards. 145 The majority also failed to overrule earlier,
misleading BIA precedents. Those precedents, combined with Board
dissension, leave the new framework vulnerable to future erosion.
The BIA may be retreating from its new mixed motives analysis
already. It published In re T-M-B-'1 6 in early 1997. The majority cited
approvingly to S-P-, 147 yet undercut that precedent's holding. The case
involved a Philippine woman who feared violent extortion attempts by a
rebel group. 41 The majority focused on the non-political nature of
extortion and held that the "reasonable inference" pointed to a
nonpersecutory motive. 14 It failed to recognize and draw inferences from
the political aims underlying the extortion. This sleight of hand defeats
the purpose of S-P-'s mixed motives analysis. 5 '
T-M-B- highlights the tenuous position of the new BIA approach.
Continued Ninth Circuit influence through judicial review is vital to
143. Id. at 7-9 (majority opinion), 18-19 (Filppu, Board Member, concurring); In re H-, Int. Dec.
3276, at 20 (B.I.A. 1996) (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting).
144. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See supra notes 126-28, 140-41 and accompanying text.
Int.Dec. 3307 (B.I.A. 1997).
Id. at 4.
Id.

149. Id. at 5.
150. The opinion generated two dissents. Chairman Schmidt criticized the majority for
misapplying recent precedent. Id at 7-8 (Schmidt, Chairman, dissenting). Board Member Rosenberg
went much further, calling the majority's analysis "puzzling, if not myopic." Id. at 9 (Rosenberg,
Board Member, dissenting).
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prevent a return to the rigid standards of the past. Even if the BIA does
not retreat further, it still differs with the court on significant issues. The
court must use the BIA's new receptiveness to effect more change.
IV. IIRIRA'S POTENTIAL EFFECT ON THE VITALITY OF THE
NINTH CIRCUIT-BIA DIALOGUE
Although the BIA presently appears more receptive to dialogue with
the Ninth Circuit, at this crucial moment Congress is trying to thwart that
exchange. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility

Act of 1996151 (IIRIRA) overhauls much of the current immigration
system. IIRIRA has received heavy criticism from scholars for its drastic
approach.'5 2 The law significantly changes asylum procedures'5 3 and also
strips or narrows judicial review in asylum and other areas."
A.

The Meaning ofNew 1NA § 242(b)(4)(D)

One portion of the law in particular could choke the dialogue between
the Ninth Circuit and the BIA. New INA § 242(b)(4)(D) heightens the
standard of review in asylum cases by mandating that a "discretionary
judgment whether to grant relief under section 208(a) [asylum] shall be
conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of
discretion." ' The Ninth Circuit already uses the "abuse of discretion"
151. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(Supp. II 1996)).
152. "[The new law] is a remarkable act of chutzpah on behalf of an agency, the INS, that has
probably been found by the courts to have violated the law more than any other federal agency."
Patrick J. McDonnell, New Law Could End Immigrants' Amnesty Hopes, L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1996,
at Al (quoting Prof. David Cole); see also 142 Cong. Rec. 511,906 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter
signed by 90 professors opposing law).
153. E.g., INA § 208(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (denying asylum if applicant could move
to safe third country); INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (requiring asylum applicants to
file within one year of arriving in United States); INA § 208(b)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)
(expanding scope of crimes that bar asylum eligibility); INA § 235(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(l)(B) (requiring summary exclusion of arriving asylum applicants unless they show
credible fear of persecution).
154. E.g., INA § 242(b)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (narrowing judicial review in asylum
cases); INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (eliminating judicial review of most discretionary relief); INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (eliminating judicial review of removal
orders for criminal aliens); INA § 242(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (limiting judicial review of summary
exclusion).
155. INA § 242(b)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D). The law also says all factual findings are
conclusive unless the court is "compelled" to conclude otherwise. INA § 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). This codifies a standard set by the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478,483-84 (1992).
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standard for reviewing the discretionary portion of an asylum decision.'5 6
Yet it often uses a lower "de novo" standard when reviewing7
interpretations of the Refugee Act and other questions of law.'
Disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and the BIA typically involves
issues of law, such as the burden of proof or the meaning of "on account
of."' 58 Many of the Ninth Circuit's key reversals relied on the "de novo"
standard. 5 9 A higher standard could diminish the Ninth Circuit's ability
to shape developing asylum law issues.
However, it remains unclear whether the new provision prevents this
type of review. The language specifically uses the word
"discretionary."' 160 Every asylum decision involves two steps, one
objective and one discretionary.' 6' One could interpret the new law as
applying only to the discretionary step and leaving review of legal issues
unmodified. Yet every asylum decision is ultimately discretionary, so the

word remains ambiguous. 62
The legislative history of the bill provides little, if any, interpretive
help. The asylum deadlines and summary exclusion procedures in the bill
64
63
received the most attention in floor debates and in commentaries'

156. See, e.g., Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954,960 (9th Cir. 1996); Padilla-Agustin v. INS, 21
F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1994).
157. See, e.g., Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1996); Surinder Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d
375, 378 (9th Cir. 1995); Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1994); Canas-Segovia v. INS,
902 F.2d 717, 721 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 502 U.S. 1086 (1992), reaffirmed and remanded,
970 F.2d 599 (1992).
158. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Harpinder Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1506 (9th Cir. 1995) (mixed motives);
Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989) (civil strife, neutrality); Desir v. Ilchert,
840 F.2d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1988) (past persecution).
160. INA § 242(b)(4)(1)), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D).
161. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158; see also supranotes 11-17 and accompanying text.
162. One scholar has noted that established doctrine requires courts to read ambiguities in favor of
the immigrant. See Lucas Guttentag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal Court JurisdictionStatutoryRestrictions and ConstitutionalRights, 74 Interpreter Releases 245, 246 (1997). Guttentag
also argues that the new asylum provision codifies standards from Elias-Zacarias.Id at 25 1. That,
however, is itself an ambiguous assessment because other scholars have read Elias-Zacariasas a
factual decision that did not alter review standards. See Anker, supranote 10, at 23.
163. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S11,906 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter to Sen. Leahy from
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) ("Blanket summary exclusion and strict time deadlines for
filing asylum applications are hurdles that many of the most deserving refugees simply will not be
able to cross."); 142 Cong. Rec. S11,904 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("We
need not gut our asylum law by allowing low-level bureaucrats to make life-and-death decisions
through summary exclusion at the border."); 142 Cong. Rec. S 11,491 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (urging support for time deadlines and summary exclusion provisions).
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because those are the most obviously onerous provisions. The few
commentators who did mention the review provision did not assess its
scope. 6 The final House conference report on IIRIRA simply restates
the language of the provision and sheds no light on its meaning."
The provision originated in the Senate, but the Senate committee
report is nearly as oblique as the conference report. 67 Itsays the bill
"narrows review in asylum cases," but does not specify how. 61 The
statement would be true whether or not the provision applied to legal
issues, because the previous law contained no codified standard for either
step in the asylum decision. The dissenting committee views do mention
judicial review, but they appear to address it in the summary exclusion

context.

69

The structure of the final law raises even more questions. The Senate

version contained a parallel provision that eliminated judicial review of
discretionary decisions other than asylum. 7 The House conference
committee's final version, which became law, deleted the word
"discretionary" in the jurisdiction-stripping provision' but retained it in

the asylum provision. 72 The conference report does not explain this
change. The change does clarify that the stripping provisions bar any
appeal on any grounds. Retaining the word "discretionary" in the asylum
provision implies that some flexibility remains and that the standard only
applies to the discretionary portion of the asylum decision. This reading

164. See, e.g., Michele R. Pistone, Asylum and Exclusion Provisions in New and Pending
Legislation: A Summary and PracticeGuide, 73 Interpreter Releases 993 (1996); Philip G. Schrag,
Don't Gut PoliticalAsylum, 10 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 93 (1996).
165. Schiesswohl, supra note 9, at 756 n.56 (noting that change could affect judicial review);
Gary E. Endelman, Congress Tightens Its Controls, N.J. L.J., Dec. 2, 1996, at 32, 32 (noting change
and questioning its meaning); New Rules Making It Harderon U.S. Immigrants, Phoenix Gazette,
Jan. 17, 1997, at A23 (noting that change could affect judicial review).
166. "A discretionary judgment of the Attorney General whether to grant asylum under section
208 is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law.... H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-828, at 219-20
(1996).
167. S.Rep. No. 104-249, at 14 (1996).
168. Id
169. Id at 54-55 (minority views of Sens. Kennedy, Simon, and Leahy); id. at 65 (minority view
of Sen. Leahy).
170. "The Attorney General's discretionary judgment whether to grant relief.., shall be
conclusive and shall not be subject to review." S.1664, 104th Cong. § 142(b)(4)(B) (1996).
171. "[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of
relief.... INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1996) (emphasis added).
172. INA § 242(b)(4)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (referring to "the Attorney General's
discretionaryjudgment whether to grant relief under section 1158(a)" (emphasis added)).
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would allow courts to continue to thoroughly review legal interpretations
by the BIA while deferring to the BIA's discretion.
2.

Other Avenues for ContinuedNinth CircuitInfluence

Even if the Ninth Circuit reads INA § 242(b)(4)(D) as a restraint on its
review of legal issues in asylum cases, the law does not contain a similar
provision for restriction on removal cases." Judicial review in this area
remains unchanged. 7 4 Most applicants file jointly for asylum and
restriction on removal, and both forms of relief include similar statutory
requirements. 7 ' Identical legal issues therefore arise in both settings, and
the same interpretation of statutory terms usually is applicable to both
forms of relief.'7 6 The court potentially could continue shaping refugee

legal standards through review of restriction on removal cases, if not
through review of asylum cases.
The Ninth Circuit can remain effective in yet another way. Although it

usually states a baseline "de novo" standard in its review of legal issues
in asylum cases, in reality the court sometimes varies from the pure de
novo standard.'7 7 It often qualifies the standard with varying degrees of
deference.'78 A recent group of cases even used the "manifestly contrary
to law" standard. 179 Interestingly, this more deferential standard has not
caused the court to automatically uphold BIA decisions. In fact, the court
used this standard in Rodriguez-Roman v. INS80 to reverse the BIA in
the controversial area of illegal departure.' 8'

173. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3) (Supp. 111996); INA § 242,8 U.S.C. § 1252.
174. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); INA § 242,8 U.S.C. § 1252.
175. The standards are the same except the burden of proof. See supra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988). However, the new law slightly
changes the definition of restriction on removal. The new law uses "because of" language rather
than "on account of." INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). It is unclear if this will affect the
future interpretation of the provision.
177. See generally Callahan;supra note 6 (noting that Ninth Circuit often applies more deferential
standard).
178. See, e.g., Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085, 1087 (9th Cir. 1993) (using de novo
standard with deference); Montecino v. INS, 915 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging
deference).
179. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 425 (9th Cir. 1996); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d
955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
180. 98 F.3d 416.
181. Id. at 424-25. The court held that the manifestly contrary to the law standard required the
BIA to follow applicable case law and the U.N. Handbook.Id. at 425.
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The panel also used Rodriguez-Roman to make unusually explicit
statements supporting judicial review. The concurrences drew from
opposite ends of the judicial spectrum, yet they agreed on the importance
of the Ninth Circuit's role and the danger inherent in eliminating
review. 2 Coming just days after IIRIRA passed, the Rodriguez-Roman
opinions also serve as implicit attacks on the new law's provisions.
Judge Kozinski, a conservative, recalled his own immigrant
experience. 3 Although he expressed respect for the INS, he also
described its behavior as "chilling" and stated that judicial review can
mean the difference between "freedom and oppression and, quite
possibly, life and death.""' Judge Reinhardt, a strong liberal, reiterated
the point by targeting the political underpinnings of agency decisions and
the BIA's overwhelming caseload." 5 The judge stated that we need
review to catch "the most egregious of the inevitable human errors." ' 6 It
appears the Ninth Circuit can, and will, continue to maintain an active
review role despite IIRIRA.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE NINTH CIRCUIT-BIA
DISCOURSE

Concurrences like those in Rodriguez-Roman show that the court is
well aware of the vital role it plays in guiding the BIA's interpretation of
the Refugee Act. The Ninth Circuit must continue actively reviewing the
BIA, whether it does so through a limited reading of IIRIRA, or through
a broad reading of the "manifestly contrary to law" standard. There
remain important, unclear aspects of asylum law, and the recent BIA
shift provides an opportunity to align U.S. asylum law closer to
international human rights standards.
A.

The Prosecution/PersecutionControversyin the Context of illegal
Departure

Identifying when legitimate prosecution ends and persecution begins
poses great difficulties in asylum law. Governments have the right to

182. Id. at 432 (Kozinski, J., concurring); id. at 433 (Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ., specially
concurring).
183. IM. at 432 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
184. Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 433 (Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ., specially concurring).
186. Id. (Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ., specially concurring).
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prosecute criminals for common crimes, 8 7 but even this prosecution can
become grounds for asylum if it is excessive 8. or conducted without

judicial process.'8 9 The issue is an umbrella for a number of complicated
sub-issues ranging from whether coup plotters can seek asylum' 90 to
whether a country's conscription laws are legitimate. 9' Adding to these
complications, an applicant can face a well-founded fear of both
legitimate prosecution and persecution. 92 The prosecution/persecution
debate is an area susceptible to political manipulation, and the
decisionmaker often risks drawing conclusions based on her view of the
persecuting country rather than the harm to the applicant.
Illegal departure is one subcategory that captures the difficulties of the
prosecution/persecution conflict. These claims involve persons who left
their home countries without permission and sought asylum because they
would face severe punishment for their departures if returned. Two
contrasting principles are at stake. First, each person has a basic right to
leave her country of origin. 93 Second, each country has the right to

control its borders.' 94 The key, as with any prosecution/persecution case,

is to balance these interests rather than choose one or the other. The U.N.
Handbook strikes this balance by recommending asylum when the
person left the country because of one of the enumerated grounds and
would face "severe" penalties if the individual were returned.9"
The Ninth Circuit and the BIA wrangled over this issue recently in
Rodriguez-Roman v. INS. 96 The applicant had fled Cuba without
187. See Mabugat v. INS, 937 F.2d 426,429 (9th Cir. 1991); U.N. Handbook,supra note 35, 9 56.
188. See Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1990); U.N. Handbook, supra
note 35, 99 57, 85.
189. See Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531,534 (9th Cir. 1988).
190. See Matter of Izatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. 149 (B.I.A. 1990).
191. Matter of Vigil, 19 I. & N. Dec. 572 (B.I.A. 1988); U.N. Handbook,supra note 35, 99 16774.
192. U.N. Handbook, supra note 35, 9 56-60. Courts must determine whether the crime is
severe enough to bar asylum eligibility. INA § 208(b)(2)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(ii) (Supp. H
1996).
193. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13(2), G.A. Res. 217 A(I), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 12(2), openedfor signatureDec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.").
194. See In re Janus & Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 873 (B.LA. 1968); Goodwin-Gill, supra note
64, at 53 (noting that governments are hesitant to grant asylum on this ground for fear of attracting
economic migrants simply dissatisfied with their home countries).
195. U.N. Handbook,supra note 35, T 61.
196. 98 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1996).
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permission because he opposed the Communist regime, and he sought
asylum in the United States.197 The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his
application, although the IJ acknowledged that Rodriguez-Roman could
face death upon repatriation." 8 He justified the decision by saying the
applicant "would not be punished for his beliefs, but for committing
crimes against the socialist state of Cuba."'" The BIA affirmed the
denial because this was prosecution, not persecution."'
The Ninth Circuit reversed in a scathing opinion. The panel cited
extensively to the UN.Handbook and instructed the BIA to follow those
guidelines.20 ' It also noted that even if this were prosecution for a
common crime, Rodriguez-Roman should still receive asylum because
excessive punishment is persecution.2 2 The BIA's result shows the
danger of approving all government actions just because they arise
within a criminal context.
The Ninth Circuit must watch this issue vigilantly because of BIA
hostility and regulation changes. Until recently, a regulation instructed
IJs to consider a country's illegal departure laws when ruling on asylum
applications.0 3 However, the Justice Department repealed that
regulation, although it still recommends case-by-case assessments. °4
This repeal could imply that illegal departure applicants must prove
unusual equities to receive relief. The Ninth Circuit must use RodriguezRoman to prevent such interpretations. In doing so, it can preserve a
humanitarian balance in illegal departure cases and in all prosecution/
persecution cases.
B.

Neutrality as PoliticalOpinion

One of the more troublesome issues in asylum law arises when an
applicant has chosen not to hold a political opinion. Neutrality defies
easy categorization under the statutory standards. On its face, neutrality
197. Id at419.
198. Id at 420.
199. Id.

200. Id at421.
201. Id at 425-26. The court also cited to pre-Refugee Act precedents from the circuit and the
BIA, noting that the Refugee Act would not have overruled those decisions because its purpose was
to comply with international law rather than defy it. Id at 427 n.17.
202. Id at 431 n.27.
203. 8 C.FR.§ 208.13(b)(2)(ii) (1996).
204. 62 Fed. Reg. 10,317 (Mar. 6, 1997) (clarifying that government does not condone blanket
denials).
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seems to fall outside the scope of "political opinion." Yet voicing
neutrality in a war zone can place one at just as much risk as becoming a
political activist. Those who choose neither side often breed contempt
from both sides.
Recognition of neutrality as political opinion advances the Refugee
Act's objective of granting relief irrespective of a victim's ideology."5
Any other rule would limit asylum to persecution victims with views
recognized in their countries' civil wars. Those who refused to join ranks
because their political views differed from both warring parties would
find no recourse despite severe persecution.2 6 Therefore, denying asylum
to neutrals is not merely a narrow reading the Refugee Act, but actually
undermines the purposes of the Act.
The Ninth Circuit was the first court to establish neutrality as a valid
ground for asylum based on political opinion20 7 and remains the only
court to grant asylum specifically on neutrality grounds."' The landmark
Bolanos-Hernandezcase rejected arguments that neutrality lacks political
elements.20 9 The court ruled instead that "[w]hen a person is aware of
contending political forces and affirmatively chooses not to join any
faction, that choice is a political one."2 ' No court has held that passive
neutrality alone suffices to justify an asylum grant.2 ' The applicant must
express her neutral views' or take some action based on her neutrality
that places her at risk.2" 3 Otherwise, she does not face persecution "on
account of" political opinion. Rather, she faces the generalized dangers
of civil war.
The BIA has refused to accept neutrality claims outside the Ninth
Circuit.214 It even stopped applying the doctrine within the circuit215 after
205. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. Although the U.N. Handbook does not discuss
neutrality, it does address mixed motives and imputed political opinion, both of which often intersect
with neutrality claims. U.N. Handbook,supra note 35,
80-83.
206. See von Sternberg, supranote 76, at 32.
207. Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1985).
208. ProBono Manual,supra note 71, at 4-13.
209. Bolanos-Hernandez,767 F.2d at 1286.
210. Id.

211. Deborah E. Anker, The Law of Asylum in the United States: A Guide to Administrative
Practiceand Case Law 128-31 (2d ed. 1991).
212. Id.
213. Compare Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1995) (granting asylum when
applicant deserted rather than participate in illegal killing), with Alonzo v. INS, 915 F.2d 546, 548
(9th Cir. 1990) (denying asylum because applicant had never revealed his neutrality).
214. Matter of Vigil, 19 1. & N. Dec. 572 (B.I.A. 1988).
215. See Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 863.
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the U.S. Supreme Court decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, which
questioned neutrality as a ground for asylum without explicitly rejecting
it.216 The Ninth Circuit agrees that neutrality is not ordinarily a ground
for asylum. The applicant must have placed herself at risk by asserting
neutrality. 217 Since Elias-Zacarias,the Ninth Circuit has reiterated that
active neutrality remains a viable ground for asylum, 28 but the BIA and
other circuits remain opposed.
The new BIA may be more receptive to the Ninth Circuit's neutrality
jurisprudence. It now clearly recognizes that persecution can exist during
civil war 2 9 and that persecutors act from mixed motives.220 Neutrality is
the next logical step in this line of analysis. The Ninth Circuit should use
this opportunity to encourage BIA conformity with the Refugee Act's
goals.
C.

The Requirement of Country-Wide Persecution

The BIA and the Ninth Circuit should work to clarify and broaden
their standards on country-wide persecution. Both fail to comply with
international interpretations, but the Ninth Circuit's approach comes
closer to the appropriate model. The issue arises when an applicant has
suffered persecution or fears persecution in one part of her home country
but not in other regions. Decisionmakers split over whether a refugee
should have sought out safe places rather than having fled the country as
a whole."
The issue is likely to become more important now that the BIA has
signaled its receptivity to gender-based claims.' Women and children
comprise eighty percent of the world's potential refugee population, but

216. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) ("Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not
taking sides with any political faction is itself the affirmative expression of a political opinion. That
seems to us not ordinarily so... ."; see also Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1488 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that U.S. Supreme Court did not overrule neutrality analysis).
217. If the U.S. Supreme Court's comment intended to question any use of neutrality as a ground
for asylum, then it fails to recognize the reality that people, including persecutors, often target those
they know refuse to take their sides.
218. Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1488; Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 863.
219. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
221. Compare Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 1995), with Matter of R-, 20 .& N.
Dec. 621 (B.I.A. 1992).
222. See In re Kasinga, Int. Dec. 3278 (1B.I.A. 1996) (holding that female genital mutilation can
constitute persecution).
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they are also the least mobile.2" The social structure of many cultures

might make life in another region of the country nearly impossible for
women even if it is safe. 4 The refugees simply would become internally
displaced, which is itself a human rights concern.' A flat rule requiring
country-wide persecution would prove both onerous on potential asylum
seekers and counterproductive from a human rights standpoint.
The language of the Refugee Act and the accompanying regulations
do not require proof of country-wide persecution. 6 The U.N. Handbook
and commentators also argue against any requirement. They prefer a
"reasonable person" standard, in which resettlement becomes relevant
only if reasonable for the individual applicant.227 This standard provides
flexibility appropriate for the humanitarian purposes of the Refugee
Convention.
The Ninth Circuit and BIA have struggled to create workable
standards for evaluating country-wide persecution. Some of the struggle
has arisen in the past persecution debate, in which the Ninth Circuit does
not require the applicant to prove country-wide persecution 28 In future
persecution cases, the Ninth Circuit originally required proof 9 but has
retreated from that stance when the persecutor has the ability to persecute
anywhere, whether or not it does so.23° The court presumes country-wide

223. Anker et al., supra note 105, at 1174.
224. An IUrecently vocalized this point when granting asylum to a Bangladeshi domestic violence
victim. The IJfound it "highly unrealistic and almost fanciful' that the applicant could have started
an independent life elsewhere in the country. IJ GrantsAsylum to BatteredBangladeshi Woman, 74
Interpreter Releases 174, 176 (1997); see also Goodwin-Gill, supranote 64, at 74 (noting that some
jurisdictions consider ability to maintain social and economic existence in another region when
making asylum decisions).
225. See generallyFitzpatrick, supra note 61 (discussing rise of"safe zones" within countries).
226. See INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A), 208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158 (Supp. 1 1996); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208 (1997).
227. See U.N. Handbook, supra note 35, 91 ("[A] person will not be excluded from refugee
status merely because he could have sought refuge in another part of the same country, if under all
the circumstances it would not have been reasonable to expect him to do so."); see also GoodwinGill, supra note 64, at 74 ("[F]or various reasons, it may be unreasonable to expect the asylum
seeker to move internally, rather than to cross an international frontier."); Sarah Ignatius, Asylum:
Country-Wide Persecution,Immigr. Newsl. 1 (Feb. 1993).
228. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text; see also Harpinder Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d
1501, 1511 (9th Cir. 1995).
229. See Quintanilla-Ticas v. INS, 783 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1986) (denying asylum because
applicant could have moved to another city).
230. See Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that death squads
have power to enforce their will whether they do so or not).
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danger when the government is the persecutor"' and also uses countrywide danger as a discretionary factor rather than a statutory requirement
in the asylum decision. 2 These changes approach the U.N. Handbook's
reasonableness standard, but the court still must clarify its position on
cases of fear of future persecution by non-governmental actors.3
The BIA usually reverses the U.N. Handbook's reasonable person
standard. In Matter of R-, it held that reasonable refugees would usually
seek internal protection.f 4 From that assumption, the BIA then decided it
would require proof of country-wide persecution in all but exceptional
cases." 5 This applies even if the government is the persecutor.? 6 The
BIA not only misreads the U.N. Handbook, but also ignores the
protective nature of the Refugee Act. 'The Act intends to provide broad
protection, not to create standards that narrow asylum based on a blanket
assumption of "unreasonableness." z 7

The BIA retreated from this presumption slightly in a footnote to

In re H-. 8 It noted that the inquiry in non-governmental persecution
cases should focus on the "ability" to persecute country-wide.23 9 This
mirrors the Ninth Circuit's policy for non-governmental persecutors.
However, the BIA did not address governmental persecution. Also,
despite the footnote's apparent liberal approach, it cited to R-, which
raises questions about whether the BIA really is making any changes.24

231. Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1995) ("It has never been thought that
there are safe places within a nation when it is the nation's government that has engaged in the
acts .... ").
232. HarpinderSingh, 63 F.3d at 1511.
233. For example, gender-based violence, such as female genital mutilation and rape, often
involves non-governmental persecutors. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee
Convention, 9 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 229,239-41 (1996).
234. Matter of R-, 20 . & N. Dec. 621,627 (B.I.A. 1992).
235. Id at 626.
236. Id at 626-27.
237. This blanket assumption is similar to ones applied in the illegal departure and civil war
contexts.
238. Int. Dec. 3276, at 19 n.7 (B.I.A. 1996). The BIA also clarified that country-wide persecution
is a discretionary factor in past persecution cases. Id See supranotes 123-25 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the BIA's new approach to past persecution.
239. H-, Int. Dec. 3276, at 19 n.7.
240. Id. (citing R-, 20 I & N Dec. 621). Only two board members have embraced the
reasonableness approach. See In re T-M-B-, Int. Dec. 3307, at 16-17 (B.I.A. 1997) (Rosenberg,
Board Member, dissenting); In re C-A-L-, Int. Dec. 3305, at 7-9 (B.LA. 1997) (Schmidt, Chairman,
dissenting), 13-16 (Rosenberg, Board Member, dissenting). Chairman Schmidt even suggests
partially shifting the burden of proof to the government. Id. at 7-8 (Schmidt, Chairman, dissenting).
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The Ninth Circuit should encourage the BIA to recognize the inherent
pervasiveness of government persecution and also should work to set a
clear standard for future persecution cases involving non-governmental
actors. The Refugee Act's humanitarian goals24 require the flexibility of
a reasonableness standard. The current lack of clarity could prove
destructive as more female asylum applicants seek refuge in this country.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dialogue between the Ninth Circuit and the BIA illustrates the
necessity and the benefit of judicial review in asylum law. Abdication to
a political agency can prove disastrous when the statute derives from
neutral principles rather than political policy norms. The Ninth Circuit
wisely pursued an active role and pressured the BIA to interpret the
Refugee Act according to its purpose rather than current executive
policy. The successful dialogue ensures adherence to the statute's human
rights foundations in many areas.
The BIA's new analytic approach also presents an opportunity to
develop the human rights aspects of asylum law even further. The Ninth
Circuit must continue its active role despite congressional attempts to
curtail review. With the Ninth Circuit and the BIA working from the
same analytic framework, they can integrate more human rights norms
into other areas of asylum law jurisprudence.

241. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.

